I often wondered what the significance of the hyphen in this title indicated – if the word extra was taken to mean simply “outside of morality” or if it implied that truthfully, in an almost meta-moral way, one is being more moral by embracing the sort of non-absolutist Truth that Nietzsche endorses. The distinction is somewhat more clear in German – “aussermoralisch” is the key term – but there remains the possiblity or at least allusion to äußert, meaning most or extremely. So perhaps full disclosure re: moral truths is the most moral thing; I didn’t really believe the argument when I made it, but having seen it, I think a case could indeed be made by which a higher degree of ethics are achieved by exposing the epistemological underpinnings of one’s own morality – and in a broader (or perhaps more constrained sense) that there is a certain politeness in disclosure of how one’s own epistemology affects methodology.
This is all ( I promise ) leading somewhere; namely, towards failure. My first couple posts on this blog were about failure – I had received a couple essays back with poor remarks from the professor, and was basically grasping for a way to reconcile what is an often maddeningly difficult world of pedagogical intent, pragmatism, and humility. This is where I find myself again – recognizing failure, but in a way that at least indicates progress and perhaps the best opportunity to actually learn something. This, I think, is one of the primary difficulties of our grading system – in many ways, the multiple objectives of receiving good grades (earning seems far too reductive) and learning are not always aligned, and occasionally at odds with one another. While perhaps treading into the realm of Chicken Soup novels, one must, occasionally, fail, and fail terribly, to learn. I’m not sure that it implies the failure was a stupid thing, or even that it was necessarily avoidable – sometimes you just have to fuck something up to figure out what you’re doing wrong. This is a bit of an inversion, I think, on the meaning of a failure; when it becomes something you have to do to proceed, it really makes more sense as a success, no? Perhaps that’s too teleological.
Anyway, digressions aside, my most recent failure is that I have a difficult time constructing a hypothesis. This, to be honest, is a problem that has been brewing for a while, and one which I’ve recognized but for the most part been fortuitous enough to avoid, either by getting lucky with professors, linguistic manipulations, or (most crudely) simply avoiding the sort of classes in which one is required to construct a hypothesis in the first place. Unfortunately, my luck appears to have run out, or perhaps more accurately, ran out, because I’ve already gotten the grade and it wasn’t good. My concern, however, isn’t the inability to construct a hypothesis; quite the opposite. I think that most hypotheses, at least as far as undergraduate (or perhaps even graduate) papers are concerned are either so broad as to be hopelessly complex, or so trivial as to be either meaningless or tautological in nature. One of the papers that received a better grade than mine had both the title and as its driving question “How German is Susanne Walters?” This seems like a fairly monumental question, and quite frankly, a bit of a silly one – there are presumably at least a dozen (tongue firmly in cheek) different elements of “Germanness” that one could choose from, which one would then have to weight in what would undoubtedly contentious manner. Finally, even if one concluded that a (fictional) person was German, what are the implications of this? How would this make the world a better, or even more interesting place?
This is perhaps the part that sticks most significantly in my throat – that even in the most successful conceivable circumstance, one in which the hypothesis is proven beyond any doubt, the reader is offered no agency. If the point were really proven that well, then one would have no recourse but to simply accept the case as presented by the author. That’s not very much fun, nor is it particularly productive. I’m not convinced that there could be a plausible circumstance in which anything of significance is proven beyond a doubt, and as such, attempt to pigeonhole various facts into a framework in which they support the author’s hypothesis is a bit of bad faith – the emphasis in a hypothesis-styled argument is placed upon being either right or wrong, a paradigm which strikes me (perhaps this is just the economist training speaking) as a pretty poor incentive if the actual condition to be sought is the spread or development of knowledge.
I think this suspicion generally holds up in books and professional-level literature as well. If I tried to come up with a hypothesis for, say, Discipline and Punish or Erotics I would be hard-pressed to settle on just one; again, anything sufficiently large enough to cover the variety of points made would presumably also be large enough to wither or break under intense scrutiny. Perhaps it’s best to leave it then as a multiplicity of hypotheses, where the reader is free to pick his own particular agenda and read it with that in mind without feeling as if he’s fighting against the tide of the author’s own opinion. I’m not convinced that Foucault ever explicitly lays out a hypothesis for his book which he will seek to prove, a move which allows him both free-range in the topics which he seeks to address and perhaps an ability to discuss or address issues which don’t work towards whatever particular goal he has in mind.
I realize that is argument, carried ad absurdium, advocates a sort of disinterested author/critic ala Ransom or Matthew Arnold. That’s not something I believe in, nor what I’m going for. What I’m trying to achieve with my writing is something a bit more modest – taking issues and investigating them from what I perceive to be useful or interesting angles, complicating them, maybe picking at a few threads here and there so that, if not unweaving the tapestry, making it not quite as whole as cut and dry as it appeared to be. This is, I think, fundamentally the goal of deconstruction; the injection of multiplicities and difficulty. A sort of “Yes, but had you considered…?” that, if not best suited for arriving at conclusions which are either true or false, is perhaps better suited for fostering discussion and debate.
I’ve been listening to a great series of lectures by a professor named Rick Roderick, who talks (pretty well) on a variety of issues from Critical Theory to post-modern intellectuals to Nietzsche. I often find, while listening to these, that I’ll start to tune out until he hits me with a particular phrase or concept that sets my mind racing for hours at a time. One that I think bears on this quite heavily is Roderick’s allusion to Nietzsche’s opening lines of Beyond Good and Evil, where Nietzsche says “suppose Truth were a woman.” This statement has to be bookended a little bit by the knowledge that Nietzsche was a little bit sexist and a little bit cynical towards women, and basically means “suppose Truth wasn’t won by the best, most rational argument – suppose truth had to be seduced, wore makeup, crept into one bed and out again the next morning.” Suppose, in short, that Truth were a little bit myth, a little bit makeup. A little bit more nods and winks and furtive glances, and a little bit less treatise. Suppose Truth were fickle.
This is, I think, the difficulty with operating in the hypothesis -> evidence -> conclusion paradigm. It’s not how real life works, and it seems a bit of an anachronism to remain within that framework in an age in which we have already been through post-modernism. It’s not even scientific; in the scientific method, it’s perfectly valid to have your results prove your hypothesis wrong. I’m actually now quite intrigued at the thought of what would happen if I wrote a paper in which I proved my hypothesis wrong. Digression. The difference is, of course, that science already exists within a tautology (perhaps more accurately a system of analytic truths) and it’s OK with that. Science says that there is a method for calculating a P value, and you can determine which one is significant. This is not the case with literature, and as such, I think it demands a certain element of hubris to write a paper in which someone attempts to prove something about a text. Would anyone really claim (particularly as an undergraduate) that he had invoked Nietzsche to prove, successfully, anything significant about the world? I hope not, and I don’t intend to. What I can, perhaps, offer, is a combination of thoughts and critiques that might prompt others to develop their own insights, even if all they managed was to afford someone else the opportunity to realize I was doing it all wrong.
TBC